

P⁴C: Philosophy—Process, Perspective, and Pluralism— for Children

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It was an unsurprisingly beautiful afternoon in Honolulu, and Dr. Jackson's *Philosophy for Children* course was in full swing. It was late in the semester, and we had become experienced P4C-ers. We were ready to experiment. We had divided our class into groups of four or five, and Dr. J had brought us "philosophical questions" to discuss as mini-communities of inquirers. As a special treat, one of the students had brought two children to class to participate in our discussion. We broke into our groups and began to address the question at hand. On the index card was written our question: *When does 'now' end?*

In my particular group (to the best of my recollection) we had two Philosophy graduate students, an Education major and a Hawaiian Studies major, both undergraduates, and one of our visiting guests – a boy in fourth or fifth grade. The "trained" philosophers (perhaps like other trained beings) began to answer the question as one might expect – with a plethora of logical options – such things as: "Now ends now." and, "Now never ends." Longer trains of thought were quickly offered: "Now cannot end because it cannot begin," etc. The discussion continued with explanations and more questions, e.g., "If now ends, when is it then?" After coming up with many possible answers, including, e.g., "Now ends when I die," the conversation in our group reached a lull. And after a general appreciation of the more humorous aspects of the discussion, we turned to our child-participant – who had been somewhat shy to join in – and asked when *he* thought 'now' ended. Smiling broadly, he said, "After the 'w.'"

It was an answer we "adults" had not thought of, but which we all recognized as brilliant, for he had brought us an alternate perspective. After hearing our many answers, he had found a way to address the question that we had not thought of. We might make the point, as "trained" philosophers, that the card did not ask when "now" ends, but when 'now' ends – noting a difference between referring to a word ("...") and referring to a concept or term ('...'); claiming "now" (the word) ends after the "w," but

'now,' (the concept) we don't know when *that* ends – we don't even know what *that* is. But this was not the point, for his answer rung true. P4C allows for the appreciation of such an answer.

P4C offers time and space for alternate thinking. As P4C facilitators, we can't be in rush, or we will be in danger of missing the subtle points which are essential to philosophy. As an example of this, teachers sometimes take to describing philosophical questions to children (and even undergraduates) as "unanswerable questions." This is often a shortcut taken to avoid such questions being proposed for discussion as *When did the dinosaurs go extinct?* While emphasizing the essential openness of philosophical questioning, this shortcut is, however, essentially a misunderstanding of the purpose of philosophy, and P4C as a community of inquiry, and the intention of philosophical inquiry as promoting the application of logical and methodological analysis to all questions and arguments.

On one particular occasion, as a response to a teacher's request for an "unanswerable question" to discuss, one of the children this past year quickly replied, "If it is unanswerable, why are we trying to answer it?" His question was quickly glossed over by the claim that we were looking for questions to discuss for P4C (something I'm sure he already knew), and the attention of the teacher moving immediately to again ask for "unanswerable questions" from other students. His questioning response to the teacher's request was, however, the perfectly appropriate logical question, and expresses succinctly the essence of why we do P4C. In retrospect we, as facilitators, should have seized upon his question and then asked, *Is it true we can't answer an unanswerable question? In what way is it true (or not true)?* Perhaps we could have discussed: *So what do we*

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mean by 'answer'? What do we mean by 'unanswerable'? How might it be possible to answer an "unanswerable" question? Or, Could there be any point in trying to do something if we think it is impossible? Can we know what is impossible before we try it? We could ask for examples, e.g., What are some examples of impossible things? How do we know these are impossible? If we could do this..., then would it be impossible? We could even have gone imaginative, e.g. Can you think of something you'd like to do that's impossible? Can you think of something that would make it possible?

A philosophical question is not an *unanswerable* question. It just doesn't have a closed or simple, or single, answer. It may have many possible answers, and may lead to many more questions. Philosophical questions are thus open questions, requiring further inquiry, and as with scientific inquiry, further evidence or logical analysis can't be dismissed.

Philosophy with Children

When we do philosophy with children we do not teach philosophy as a subject; we teach by example, the philosophical *method* – a method of reasoned inquiry and logical analysis often referred to as "Socratic." As the 'teaching' is done by questioning, we are not trying to teach facts or information (although these are important steps in any inquiry), but a way of examining knowledge, realizing associations (inferences and similarities) and a method and practice of focused inquiry in community. Thus, fundamentally, what is being 'taught' is a method of creative learning and productive communication, a method of reasoned in-

quiry and analysis. If we recognize that education of the individual is a life-long process – a constantly required synthetic or constructive activity which proceeds in community – then such a method is essential to continued productive self-development.


The P4C "teacher" acts as a facilitator or coordinator for the group, teaching the method of inquiry by example – asking the questions. Experience in the active P4C classroom teaches the teacher that the community of inquiry has a life of its own; the natural logical ability of the students is surprising, and, after teaching the toolkit, the group quickly becomes self-facilitating. The children question one another, returning to each other's statements. The inquiry proceeds, and, as in scientific inquiry, given the tools of analysis, the community refines the questions and comes to agree upon the relevance of other questions and tentative answers. The facilitator becomes almost an observer, sometimes a peace-keeper, and the successful P4C discussion takes on a life and direction of its own.

While this may be disconcerting at first, especially for teachers already on a tight schedule of lesson plans and benchmarks, the benefits for the child as an individual are exponential; and although the attainments are perhaps not easy to evaluate by current standardized testing procedures,¹ they are evident in real testing experiences—the deeper and continuing success of the children as individuals who are continuously integrating experience and learning. They realize the power and potential of their thinking and reasoning through such questions as: *What do you mean by "x"? Why do you think that? Can you give reasons? Is "x" true? How do we know? Can you give an example? Can*

you think of a counterexample? Is this a good inference? Isn't this assuming "x"? After practicing such inquiry in P4C, the P4C toolkit starts to be used outside of its original purview and becomes an integrated part of the thinking of the students. Philosophy for children is thus an effort to encourage productive habits of thought.²

Such methodological inquiry is essential because it is revealing. Questions bring focus to the issues relevant to the discussion of the community and the decisions and beliefs of the individual. The natural ambiguity of language and thought can be recognized, brought forward and questioned. Such questions further and focus the inquiry and enable the individual to integrate their own knowledge into a synthetic whole. This

P4C Is Like a Child



P4C is like a Child

By Amanda

P4C is like a Child because it grows and doesn't ever stay the same. During P4C, I will always find something new because there are so many experiences to discover

leads to the recognition of valid distinctions and gives confidence and a sense of self-determination to the learning process. Many believe encouraging active questioning and analysis greatly increases the capacity and ability of the students to learn and understand, as well as to communicate clearly and effectively, to pursue informed opinions, and develop productive habits and make sound decisions.

In an excellent mini-guide to "The Art of Asking Essential Questions,"³ Dr. Linda Elder and Dr. Richard Paul of *The Foundation for Critical Thinking* have divided questions into three categories: (1) questions of *procedure*, (2) questions of *preference*, and (3) questions of *judgment*. For questions of *procedure*, there is a one-system, or established means of arriving at an answer. These are often matters of definition, e.g. *What is 5 + 7? Which has the shorter wavelength, red or blue?* The second type of question, questions of *preference*, have no established or preferred system of adjudication, e.g., *What is your favorite animal? Would you rather visit the past or the future?* Answers to these second type of questions may be justified, e.g., *I like cats best because they purr; I would go to the future because we already have some idea what has happened in the past.* I may convince others with my justification, or may start an interesting debate, but they are ultimately questions with no rational, or objectively verifiable means of adjudication. The third type of question Paul and Elder distinguish, questions of *judgment*, require a method of rational adjudication. They write, "We evaluate answers to these questions using universal intellectual standards such as clarity, accuracy, relevance, etc." These are often social or political questions, questions involving values, or complex reasoning and assumptions, e.g., *Are there basic human rights? Should parents be allowed to determine if their children receive medical treatment in all cases?* These questions require agreed upon definitions and premises. To discuss them productively, we need to locate, examine and analyze the facts and their relevance, as well as our values. Such questions require not only that we successfully analyze our assumptions and our inferences, but that we also examine our emotions and goals – our perspective and the perspectives of others.

What is useful, I think, to consider as educators is that there are very few real-life questions that are questions of *procedure* alone; and although these are the easiest to test in a standardized way, it is questions of *judgment* that pervade our experience. Questions of judgment pervade almost all questions of procedure and questions of preference. Questions of judgment are questions which appropriately involve rational adjudication and the analysis of the framework which lay in the background of our answers. We must ask about assumptions and inferences, about evidence and counter-evidence, and question that we consider true. Even questions of procedure require acceptance of an established system which can be changed or questioned, e.g., the appropriate answer to $11 + 11$, is 110 , if we are working within a binary system. As well, our questions of preferences in-

volve questions of judgment, and may be more or less examined and more or less useful.

It is interesting to consider that there may be commercial and political interest in convincing us not only that there *are* questions that are *simply* matters of procedure or preference, but that *most* questions are *simple* questions of procedure, or questions of preference. We are thus more easily convinced, led and misled, not looking toward the difficult process of open inquiry and rational adjudication. It is also *easier* to consider questions of judgment as matters of preference or matters of procedure. Our questions then have clear (or absolute) answers: clearly right, clearly wrong, or clearly relative. We don't have to inquire further or remain open to other possibilities. Often we hold to our beliefs and our habits even when our experience would suggest we should question them, and sometimes we don't even recognize them. Habit informs our individual practice; and our mental processes, like our biological processes are inertial, often to our detriment. Conflict, which often results from the inability to change or to compromise, is in many ways simply easier than trying to distinguish what we know, or what we share in common, from what we do not.

It is often said in introductory Philosophy courses that "philosophy" comes from the Greek words *philo-* "loving" + *sophia* "wisdom." To love wisdom is an attitude which requires openness. It is an attitude which befriends inquiry and centers itself, ideally, in uncertainty, i.e., not being certain or closed with respect to what one deems to be true or adequate knowledge. Such openness is the only method with which to acquire truth from knowledge and wisdom from experience. Yet openness and inquiry alone are not enough, philosophical inquiry requires logic and reason – a methodology.

Understood as promoting reasoned inquiry in community, Philosophy for Children aims at providing students the tools with which to develop a good (i.e., coherent and useful), examined framework within which to understand and interpret their experience. Such a personal and subjective framework, as the framework of our ability to know, is unavoidable. Each one of us, in this sense, has a philosophy of a sort, whether or not we consciously pursue its development or examine its coherence. P4C is not aimed at providing individual students the particular scaffolding or its content, but rather the tools with which to build such foundations as solid, and well-grounded. These tools are more essential than any particular foundation of information, since in the course of our experience we often find the foundations we have laid have shifted or that the knowledge we have assumed is not as grounded or as true as we once thought. We find with our changing information and experience that we must sometimes reconstruct.

While our foundational beliefs should be solid (i.e., sound and valid) we cannot expect they will suffice the way we have first built them. For most of what we have built we have not built intentionally but instead has been occasioned by our experience, much of which we have not chosen. Fur-

thermore, while our thoughts are our own, they are formed only in a community of other knowers and within an extensive network of knowledge. Our knowledge is not and should not be set in stone, but is built upon, and for our changing experience. We revise our past knowledge and thoughts as we learn more. This is the way in which knowledge and wisdom are developed within scientific and philosophic communities of inquiry. Without acquiring the ability to develop appropriate or useful distinctions and sound habits of reasoning, the openness of our inquiry cannot achieve knowledge or wisdom.

Process and Perspective

In his 1929 book, *The Aims of Education*, Alfred North Whitehead writes,

You may not divide the seamless coat of learning. What education has to impart is an intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a particular body of knowledge which has peculiar reference to the life of the being possessing it.⁴

As individuals, our experience is inescapably filtered by our own thoughts and our own knowledge. As thinking individuals, our own thoughts are the constant center of our experience – a center that is constantly changing, or in constant process of becoming. To *know* anything requires a knower, i.e., that it be known *from a limited or subjective perspective*. Any understanding we achieve is thus both limited and *made possible* by our own particular perspective. In this way, subjectivity is essential to knowledge.

As we act in the world and interact with the world and with others, we are questioning in an unspoken way, and are as well constantly being questioned. Such questioning, examined or unexamined provides the ground for our experience and our perceptions and conceptions of ourselves and others. The degree to which we are able to question productively determines the degree to which we are self-determining individuals. If our thoughts and our actions proceed without directed questioning or intentional deliberation, we function primarily out of habit and previously determined psychological association. In this way, we do not fully participate in our experience.

Søren Kierkegaard (a Danish philosopher writing in the 19th century) called this unexamined perspective “inauthentic.” Recognizing the subjectivity of individuality and the necessity for constant choice, he believed that any and all truth(s) require subjective appropriation. “The truth exists only in the process of becoming, in the process of appropriation.”⁵ In his work, Kierkegaard demonstrated his view of the importance of individual decision and freedom with the method of *indirect communication*, taking different points of view, publishing these under pseudonymous names, creating a conversation or dialogue of reasoned preferences among which the reader must choose. Each one

of us as individuals, Kierkegaard says, must “untie the knot for ourselves.”

In Kierkegaard’s view, truth belongs only to a perceiving individual – it is experienced; and all truths, to be realized as true, require subjective appropriation. We must make them our own – or think them in our own voice – before we can realize their truth. We incorporate experience integrating it with past experience and future expectation. Our subjectivity as a process of living is itself the ground of truth. And we are required by our individuality and subjectivity to constantly decide what is true. As Kierkegaard describes it, subjectivity *is* truth. In this sense, our habits of thinking and the perspective we have developed are not only the basis of our individuality, but also the ultimate source of our freedom and our personal responsibility. As P4C facilitators we might be said to use such an indirect method of communication, a method of asking questions and analyzing assumptions and implications, or offering alternative possibilities.

As individuals, we require something like a scientific method, emphasizing reasoning and analysis, and proceeding within a community of inquirers with multiple perspectives and thus enabling convergence on valid knowledge. However, instead of physical experimentation, we need the ability to do logical analysis and experimentation. The philosophical method emphasizes the “thought experiment” and the analysis of our thinking itself. As Whitehead describes it:

The philosophic attitude is a resolute attempt to enlarge the understanding of the scope of application of every notion which enters into our current thought. The philosophic attempt takes every word, and every phrase. In the verbal expression of thought, and asks, What does it mean? It refuses to be satisfied by the conventional presupposition that every sensible person knows the answer. As soon as you rest satisfied with primitive ideas, and with primitive propositions, You have ceased to be a philosopher.⁶

In P4C we emphasize that we are, in any given class, a “community of inquirers.” This phrase was originally coined by Charles Sanders Peirce. Basing his conception of truth on the indisputable successes of the scientific method, he emphasized that truth is an ideal limit toward which, given sufficient time and resources, divergent communities of inquiry would converge. As individuals, our knowing is distinctly personal and necessarily subjectively appropriated. As thinkers, we are choosers. We cannot avoid the freedom and responsibility of our own individuality. We each of us, the ultimate arbiter and, for our own decisions and our own thoughts and experience, each one of us is ultimately responsible. But we are “only human,” each one of us, infinitely fallible. In community inquiry, we achieve a more finite, or more limited fallibility. We have knowledge only in and through conversation and community.


Many of our disagreements, as Peirce and many other

philosophically minded thinkers have realized, are in fact linguistic; we do not share the same definitions or do not share the same associations of our words or our thoughts. We do not have the same expectations of events. Uncovering these discrepancies requires thoughtful and reasoned analysis. If we heed Kierkegaard, Whitehead and Peirce, we recognize that while truth must be subjectively appropriated, or realized by the individual in his or her life-experience

as a constantly developing process, we cannot avoid converging on truth in community. The self-evidence of truth is its hallmark; it is how we, as privately thinking individuals, recognize truth, as publicly observable, or reasonable and reasoned fact.

We cannot hold to our beliefs and expectations simply because we have been taught them, because we are used to them, or because we are somehow personally attached to them. Faced with multiple possible perspectives and constantly new experience, we are faced with inquiry, and we must constantly "decide for ourselves," as Kierkegaard proclaimed. So we must remain both open and critical, making a habit from such self-examination. With such openness, what we lose – our rigid definitions of our words, of ourselves and others, is more than made up for by what we gain – the ability to learn successfully, to compromise, to experience with greater clarity and to change and adapt to current circumstances, and integrate constantly new experience.

In the activity of philosophy, we encourage the examination of our perspective and the meanings of our words, and experimentation with other possible perspectives. We question the structure our thinking and why we believe as we do. This is for our own benefit as well as the benefit of others. As well, since it is by the testimony of others that we learn of ourselves as individuals,⁷ we must constantly examine the testimony of others for its soundness and validity. We hope to accurately locate that which we truly disagree upon and not stay at the surface of rhetoric or misunderstanding. As individual thinkers in communities, we



must be capable of, and open to, recognizing the cracks in our foundations (the discrepancies in our thought-structures and those of others) and to assess them carefully and in a reasoned and productive, or objectively justifiable, way.

Strangely enough, in addition to community, it is the fallibility of our cognition, and its perspectival limitation, which enable knowledge. Knowing is itself a *process*, one which takes a span of time, a certain length of awareness or distance, or perspective. It takes both time, and other assumptions or definitions, to determine—for example—the sum of $5 + 7$. All knowledge is connected with other knowledge. It is likewise with error. We realize that the snake was only a stick if we look again, if we look closer, and if we are able to revise our former perception, realigning it with our new perception. We need alternate perspectives in order to recognize the error. Another perspective may be a gestalt shift, e.g., and we can choose to see either a vase or two faces by altering our perception of which is in the foreground.

Our perception, and thus our knowledge, is only evaluative and qualitative. It is relative. Truth stands apart only against error and vice versa. We see by such distinctions and discriminations, only because we have a located (defined and limited) perspective, and only because this perspective is alterable, and fallible. Without the ability to change our perspective, to build and revise our knowledge, and thus to take more than one perspective (e.g., two eyes instead of one) we cannot adequately recognize depth or distinction.

One perspective on Philosophy for Children is that it is

an effort toward exercising and maximizing this ability, which is essentially a *flexibility*. By enabling the rational perception and recognition (and re-cognition) of alternate viewpoints we enable the individual, as a center of decision, to gain perspective, enabling a better perception of where he or she stands and why.

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
- T.S. Eliot, *Four Quartets*

P4C and Pluralism

In an age of conflicting information and overwhelmingly-promoted differing opinions, this ability, or flexibility, to recognize position and perspective in oneself and others, becomes increasingly necessary. In such a pressing environment, adequate learning is not simply a matter of information acquisition and retrieval, but requires an advanced ability to evaluate information, its sources and objectives, and to analyze and distinguish among competing systems and conflicting views. It requires an attitude which invites continued inquiry and is comfortable with fallibility and uncertainty. In our modern era of mass information and the expectation of low-attention, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the amount of information (often superficial) and endless personal options available – and further overwhelmed by their forceful emotive promotion. How should we prepare children to survive successfully – for their own well-being and happiness – in such confusing circumstance?

In a commencement speech at Mount Ida College, the Harvard University Professor Rev. Peter Gomes said, “It is a good life and not a good living that the wise aspire to.” He recognized two facets of such a life as (1) embracing our failures, as they have a far greater impact upon us as individuals and from which we learn much more than our successes; and, (2) attempting the impossible by freely imagining possibilities, since we do not truly know the limits of what is possible. These qualities, he said, would be the start toward a good life.

Understanding our experience in a way productive to the quality of our own life requires not only integrating experience and gathering relevant information, but also examining and re-examining our knowledge and ourselves in a way that admits of non-closure. This requires not only the integrity of reason but the creativity of imagination – the freedom of open-questions and alternative frameworks.

Recognizing and synthesizing knowledge and experience effectively enables adaptation to ever novel circumstance and productive integration of further information and experience. As individuals, we have different experiences and are exposed to different information; it is inevitable that

we understand things somewhat differently. We are seemingly left in a difficult position between *authoritarianism* (i.e., a single truth to be accepted on the basis of the power of position or of the prevailing or local norm) and *relativism* (i.e., recognition of the validity of different truths with no way to adjudicate between them).⁸ An alternative to these two extremes is a third position, one which is a fact of the world and, some would say, a value we should uphold – *pluralism*. As with questions of judgment, pluralistic answers require examination, adjudication, thoughtfulness, and clear expression. To defend the fact of pluralism as a value and perspective to be protected, against the tendencies of authoritarianism or relativism, requires something special. In P4C we hope to foster a method of reasoned inquiry and analysis, as well as encourage a productive and useful imagination.

As in a scientific inquiry, in philosophical inquiry, a community of concerned inquirers will converge on similar questions and similar answers, and given adequate analysis and definition, time and resources, there will be a convergence of ideas and alternatives. Peirce’s consensus or convergence theory of truth (as an ideal limit of methodological inquiry) and Kierkegaard’s conception of truth as subjectivity (or that which is subjectively appropriated in absolute inwardness) would seem each to require trust, in reason and thus in the individual. Both philosophers recognized this, but claimed this trust was itself a condition of the possibility of realizing any truth, i.e., that we do and must trust reason, ourselves and others is a factual condition. Peirce writes with regard to those who might lack this trust in truth or reason,

These minds do not seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease; they seem to think that the opinion which is natural for one man is not so for another, and that belief will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead another man to a different result, they betray their feeble hold of the conception of what truth is.⁹

Truth is an unavoidable phenomenon. It is not created but disclosed, revealed in inquiry. Truth is, in a sense, what we share. Peirce makes the point, that by contenting ourselves with fixing and holding our own beliefs we show that we have no desire for truth and no recognition that it is, after all, a publicly recognizable matter. We seem to have very little trust or expectation today that we might agree on what is true. We seem to have lost our trust in our own reasoning ability and that of others. Since it is unavoidable that we rely on the testimony of others, we are in a position in which we must trust human subjectivity and reason, and we must trust the integrity of others.

If we are teachers of others, as well as self-recognized lifelong learners, we cannot be confined by the method of tenacity or that of authority to determine truth. As Kierke-

gaard recognized we must always and at every moment choose for ourselves. Since even avoiding choosing is making a choice, our radical subjectivity with its radical responsibility is unavoidable, and the methods of tenaciously holding beliefs or holding them on the basis of authority are fundamentally opposed to genuine inquiry and education. It is the thoroughness and objectivity of the inquiry, requiring that we trust in human reason and subjectivity, which is prerequisite to coming to any adequate understanding.

As P4C facilitators, we ask for reasons and encourage the students to envision conceptual relations. Such questions have only to be hypothetical, "If..., then..." As facilitators, we do not have to provide answers. We do not have to be critical or judge the thoughts of the students as good or bad, correct or incorrect. It is only essential that we ask the rational questions, the questions that follow naturally in a dialogue of focused and directed inquiry, e.g., *If that is true, what else might follow? If we want to answer this question, what other questions might we ask?* It is our continuing questions and *not* our "certain" answers which are most critical to the development of our thinking and our knowing, and that of our students.

Rational examination and adjudication requires great effort and great uncertainty (or non-certainty). As philosophers, or friends of truth, we must readily recognize that this is not the most comfortable position. If we are aware of our own thinking with its infinite fallibility and our own perspective with its radical limitation, we realize the unavoidability of this position. It can only be ameliorated and adapted to by the spirit of open inquiry and reasoned analysis. Being open to changing our beliefs requires great personal integrity and security. But many proponents of P4C believe this is precisely what we want to give our students and our children. As Whitehead, among others, has noted, our intellects have evolved in order to enable us to gather more food and to successfully reproduce ourselves and our ideas, but the modern world of global communication and democratization seems to require more.

Without a means of adjudication, pluralism easily becomes relativism. Without the openness of genuine concern and genuine inquiry we take questions of judgment as simple questions of preference or procedure. Without befriending wisdom or loving truth we appeal to the relativity of the issues involved, or to an authority. As ultimate justifications these appeals do at least as much harm as good. Pluralism, like relativism, admits the validity of different perspectives; but unlike relativism, a pluralistic standpoint recognizes that these perspectives may be more or less adequate than one another, more or less limited, and more or less valid in any given circumstance. Maintaining a productive pluralism requires reasoned adjudication, as well as continuing openness and revision.

Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder remains. There have been added, however, some grasp of

the immensity of things, some purification of emotion by understanding.¹⁰

In Conclusion: Why P4C?

I have proposed that "doing philosophy" or pursuing philosophical inquiry with children allows for the recognition of *three Ps* – *process*, *perspective*, and *pluralism* – as important aspects of educating in the modern environment; and that this can contribute significantly to the students' individual development. Very briefly stated, this is because:

(1) The education of the individual is a lifelong *process* and, since individuals and their thinking are constantly in process, they require the tools of learning – inquiry and analysis – more than just the acquisition of information.

(2) The individual knows from a subjective *perspective* requiring constant decision and re-integration in order to maintain subjective integrity; and in this process the recognition and analysis of alternate perspectives is essential.

(3) A *pluralistic* environment is both unavoidable and desirable since knowledge is arrived at by the individual within a community of other thinkers and within a network of knowledge.

In this view, some of the important goals of P4C are: to enable and encourage the individual's ability to examine, synthesize and relate information, experience, and ideas; to allow for the free play of a productive imagination and space for continued learning; and to develop good habits of inquiry and practice in the methods of logical analysis and reasoned adjudication.

Notes

1. Perhaps this is due to an overemphasis on the "basic skills" (of procedure) and a real deficit in the standardized tests for K-12. For example, the LSAT (Law School Aptitude Test) tests such analytic ability. As well, books of "logic puzzles" or "logic games" are written for children and could be adapted for such purposes.

2. The basic toolkit: WRAITEC : *W*: What? Why?, *R*: Reasons, *A*: Assumptions, *I*: Inferences (If...then...), *E*: Examples, Evidence, *C*: Counterexamples.

3. Elder and Paul, "The Art of Asking Essential Questions," Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2002, p. 9.

4. *The Aims of Education*, A. N. Whitehead, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929 (Also Williams and Norgate, London, 1932 edition), p. 18.

5. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, (*Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, 1846) tr. Swenson and Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, p. 72.

6. A. N. Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1938, p. 234.

7. C.S. Peirce, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (1868) 2, 103-114.

8. A parallel can be drawn between 'authoritarianism' and 'questions of procedure' and 'relativism' and 'questions of preference;' 'pluralism' can be related to 'questions of judgment.'

9. C.S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," *Popular Science Monthly* 12 (January 1878), 286-302.

10. A. N. Whitehead, *Modes of Thought*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1938, p. 232.